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A considerable number of U.S. borrowers still choose adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs) over fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) even when interest 
rates are historically very low. This study examines the psychological reasons 
for the popularity of ARMs by testing the Prospect theory’s reflection 
hypothesis. Experiments are conducted using business professionals. The 
results suggest that psychological factors may explain why ARM borrowers 
tend to ignore the associated risk factors, focusing heavily upon pricing 
factors when choosing mortgage type. The results also indicate that 
borrowers may be viewing mortgage selection as part of a positive choice; 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The choice of a residential mortgage is one of the most significant decisions that 
people make in terms of household risk management. At the end of the third quarter 
of 2007, the value of outstanding U.S. residential mortgages was $10 trillion, which 
was 74% of the GDP (Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 2007). U.S. residential 
mortgages can be classified into two broad categories: fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) 
and adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). A FRM specifies an interest rate that stays 
fixed for the life of the mortgage (typically 15 or 30 years) regardless of market 
conditions. An ARM, which was first introduced during the 1980s, is a mortgage in 
which the interest rate is not fixed, but tied to an index (market interest rate) and 
periodically adjusted (typically once a year) as the rate index moves up or down. In 
recent years, lenders offer ARMs with initial lock-in periods of 3, 5, 7, or 10 years so 
that the first payment adjustment is postponed into the future. Existence of the 
well-developed secondary mortgage market is an important feature of the U.S. 
residential mortgage market. In the secondary mortgage market, existing mortgages 
are bought and sold, and purchased mortgages are repackaged into various types of 
mortgage-related securities mainly via government sponsored enterprises, such as the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Corporation (Freddie Mac). Thus, the secondary mortgage market separates 
functions of originating, funding and servicing. For example, approximately 65% of 
the residential mortgage loans originated in the primary market were sold to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in 2001 (Dennis & Pinkowish, 2004). Being large financial 
institutions with the capacity to sell their loans in a secondary mortgage market, 
lenders in the U.S. primary market often behave as if they were risk-neutral 
(Brueckner, 1993). Therefore, the borrowers’ choice between the FRMs and ARMs 
has major implications with respect to interest rate risk-sharing between borrowers 
and lenders. During some time periods, ARMs have accounted for nearly 70% of 
conventional residential mortgage loans in the U.S. Figure 1 shows that many U.S. 
borrowers still choose ARMs over FRMs, even when interest rates are low. During 
2004-2005, while interest rates remained at 30-year lows, ARMs accounted for 
approximately one-third of all conventional mortgage originations. Note that the 
ARM share shown in Figure 1 is conservative. Over the past 20 years, the average 
ARM loan was 1.3 times larger than the average FRM loan. Therefore, the ARM 
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After the rise of ARMs during the 1980s, a number of studies on the choice of 
mortgage have been published.
1 Theoretical studies, such as Brueckner (1993), and 
Campbell and Cocco (2003), provide normative reasons for borrowers’ choice of 
ARMs by developing models of optimum mortgage choice. Brueckner (1993) 
presents a two-period model of optimum mortgage choice and the comparative static 
of the model indicates that when borrowers are more impatient than lenders and have 
a strong desire for current consumption, they are likely to choose the lower payment 
streams of ARMs at the expense of interest rate risk exposure. Borrowers would also 
be expected to choose ARMs over FRMs when interest rate variance decreases, 
borrowers become less risk-averse, the general level of interest rates rises, or the 
term structure of interest rates becomes steeper (i.e., the spread between FRM and 
ARM interest rates widens). Campbell and Cocco (2003) develop a dynamic 
(life-cycle) model describing optimal consumption and mortgage choices. Numerical 
simulation shows that borrowers, who have relatively small mortgages, stable 
income, low default costs, and high moving probabilities, should choose ARMs over 
FRMs. 
 
Normative implications are important guidelines for borrowers to make rational 
mortgage choice decisions, and can be used as specifications for the choice of 
mortgage equations in empirical studies. Empirical studies, such as Phillips and 
VanderHoff (1991, 1994), and Jones, Miller, and Riddiough (1995), test normative 
implications measuring the relative significance of potential factors that affect  
mortgage choices of borrowers. Utilizing mortgage transaction data from the 
National Association of Realtors and a large national lending institution, Phillips and 
VanderHoff (1991, 1994) show that pricing variables, such as teaser discounts of 
ARMs and points on ARMs and FRMs, play a dominant role in deciding which 
mortgage is chosen. When ARMs are cheap relative to FRMs, borrowers will choose 
ARMs. In general, borrower characteristics, such as age, income and mobility, are 
found to have only a weak influence on mortgage choices. Jones, Miller, and 
Riddiough (1995) estimate a time series model of ARM market shares over 7 years 
(1986-1992) and show that the ARM market share increases when mortgage rates are 
above historical averages, and decreases when mortgage rates are below historical 
averages. The survey by Lino (1992) illustrates that many borrowers are unable to 
determine correctly which type of mortgage has the higher expected cost. In 
addition, the results imply that borrowers adjust their expectations of future 
expenses, income, and mortgage payments to justify their choice of mortgage type. 
Bucks and Pence (2005) find that households often have trouble understanding the 
details of ARMs: 42% of people with ARMs underestimate interest rate caps 
compared to lender-reported data and ARM borrowers frequently misreport the 
index to which rate changes are tied.   
 
Some studies have reported that ARMs expose borrowers to a great deal of interest 
rate risk. VanderHoff (1996) compares the probabilities of prepayment and default 
for FRMs and ARMs and finds that ARMs defaulted more often than FRMs. These 
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defaults are not the result of rational wealth maximizing decisions to exercise options 
imbedded in mortgages. Rather, the defaults are the result of rising monthly payment 
levels. Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Huszar (2005) examine the performance and 
associated risk of 3/27 hybrid ARMs and show that their default risk is relatively 
high, especially around month 36 when the hybrid mortgage converts from a FRM to 
an ARM, thus emphasizing the riskiness of ARMs.   
 
Campbell and Cocco’s (2003) theoretical model of mortgage choice suggests that  
borrowers’ choice of ARMs may be an attempt to reduce short term costs if 
borrowers know that they are highly likely to move in the near future, especially 
when housing prices are expected to increase in the short run. However, VanderHoff 
(1996) finds evidence that, in actuality, ARM holders are less mobile than FRM 
holders, which implies that ARM holders often end up exposing themselves to ARM 
interest rate risks for a longer period than they originally anticipated. This is 
especially when housing prices stop rising. In such cases, shortsighted ARM holders 
may not be able to escape their risky loans by selling or refinancing, which is the 
situation for many borrowers in the current U.S. home mortgage market. The gap 
between normative borrower behavior and empirical evidence is the focus of the 
current study. We examine the psychological reasons that underlie observable 
behaviors of borrowers resulting in the popularity of ARMs in the U.S. (e.g., 
choosing a mortgage with a lower initial rate to purchase a home). This behavioral 
investigation contributes to the existing literature on the choice of mortgage by 
incorporating psychological traits to examine attitudes of borrowers towards interest 
rate risk in residential mortgages.   
 
Behavioral investigation is descriptive, attempting to describe what people do, 
focusing on behaviors themselves, rather than upon their consequences. In the area 
of real estate, behavioral investigations have been extensively conducted to examine 
the actual valuation processes of appraisers (valuers) both in the U.S and U.K. For 
example, inspired by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) work in heuristic problem 
solving, Gallimore (1994, 1996), Diaz and Hansz (1997), and Diaz and Wolverton 
(1998) seek evidence of biases in valuation judgment using controlled experiments. 
Gallimore (1994) finds evidence of two psychological effects, anchoring and 
recency, suggesting that valuers in the U.K. tend to inappropriately overweigh 
information received most recently. Seeking evidence of confirmation bias, 
Gallimore (1996) investigates whether expert valuers in the U.K. seek only 
information in support of preliminary opinions made by themselves earlier and the 
presence of confirmation bias is not proven in valuation judgment. Diaz and Hansz 
(1997) find that expert appraisers in the U.S. operating in geographically unfamiliar 
markets are influenced by anonymous expert opinions, which shows the evidence of 
anchoring in the valuation process. Diaz and Wolverton (1998) uncover the behavior 
of appraisers who use their own previous value judgments as anchoring reference 
points. Although a number of studies focused on the actual behavior of valuation 
experts testing psychological effects have emerged, the behavior of other types of 
participants in real estate is still unexplored.   103        Mori, Diaz III and Ziobrowski 
 
                                           
We test the Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as 
a contributing factor in a borrower’s choice of mortgage type. Specifically, we test 
the research hypothesis that people, who exhibit a risk-averse preference for a fixed 
rate bond (FRB) over a variable rate bond (VRB) when choosing a bond type, tend 
to demonstrate a risk-seeking preference for an ARM over a FRM, when choosing a 
mortgage type. Experiments were conducted using business professionals. We find 
that risk-averse people tend to become more risk-seeking when choosing a mortgage 
type, leaning more toward ARMs, which may be the psychological reason for its 
observed popularity. We also find evidence that borrowers behave differently 
depending on their propensity for current consumption (i.e., consumption-oriented 




2.  Prospect Theory 
 
The Nobel Prize winning
2 Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) states that people tend to be more risk-averse in positive decision 
situations, while they tend to be more risk-seeking in negative choice situations. 
Taking out a mortgage means people will have negative cash flows (compared to 
having no mortgage payments) over time, which are fixed with FRMs and tied to 
market interest rates with ARMs. Thus, the choice between ARMs and FRMs can be 
framed as a choice between two types of negative prospects (loss situations) 
associated with uncertainty. When people invest in a bond, they receive coupon 
income over time, which is fixed with FRBs and tied to a market interest rate with 
VRBs. Thus, the choice between FRBs and VRBs can be framed as the choice 
between two types of positive prospects (gain situation) under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
 
One could argue that the borrowers’ choice between ARMs and FRMs may be 
framed as a choice between whether or not to purchase insurance against the interest 
rate risk of ARMs by viewing the negative certain payments of FRMs as costs rather 
than a choice between the two types of losses. In such a case, borrowers should tend 
to choose FRMs over ARMs, because they will be less averse to the sure negative 
payments of FRMs according to Kahneman and Tversky (1984). In fact, not all 
borrowers necessarily frame the choice of mortgage in the same way. Some 
borrowers may frame it as the choice of buying insurance, with most of them 
choosing FRMs over ARMs; whereas others may frame it as the choice between two 
types of negative prospects, with most of them choosing ARMs over FRMs. Since 
the focus of the current study is the rationale for the seemingly risk-ignoring 
behavior of ARM borrowers, we primarily assess the behavior of borrowers who 
frame the choice of mortgage as a choice between two types of negative prospects, 
by enforcing this hypothesized decision frame upon study participants. The 
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behaviors of the participants in no-framing control situations are also examined to 
gain insights regarding future research on framing. 
 
Therefore, the Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis, in combination with the 
already hypothesized decision frames, provides the research hypothesis of the current 
study: people, who exhibit a risk-averse preference for a FRB over a VRB when 
choosing a bond type, tend to demonstrate a risk-seeking preference for an ARM 
over a FRM, when choosing a mortgage type. 
 
 
3.  Methodology 
 
The testing of the research hypothesis essentially involves a test of the causal 
relationship between the sign of the cash flow and decision-maker risk preferences. 
Controlled experiments are powerful tools for collecting evidence of causality 
(internal validity) because they offer an opportunity for the researcher to isolate the 
impact of key explanatory variables and control for any influence of exogenous 
factors, and thus, they have been the most popular tool among behaviorists studying 
real estate experts. Therefore, instead of testing many potential factors at the same 
time, we exercised the experimental method, controlling for potential confounding 
factors in order to explicitly test the research hypothesis. Regardless of such 
advantages of controlled experiments, the approach is often criticized as being 
unrealistic; behaviors observed in a “laboratory” without real money at stake may be 
apart from those in a real world. In fact, reviewing 74 experiments with no, low, or 
high financial incentives, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) find that financial incentives 
actually affect the behaviors in effort-responsive tasks, such as recalling items from 
memory. However, the authors find no effect of financial incentives on average 
behaviors in non-effort-responsive tasks, such as games, auctions, and risky choices, 
although variance of behavior is usually reduced by higher financial incentives. 
More recently, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner (2006) 
examine the possibility of any differences in risky choice (lottery choice) decisions 
between those without real money at stake and those with real money at stake (€300) 
using 450 randomly selected participants from all over Germany. They find that the 
risk taking behavior observed in a laboratory-like environment without real money at 
stake is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior. Therefore, our study is 
designed purposefully to enhance internal validity as a study at the very earliest stage 
of behavioral research in home mortgage choice. It serves as a significant foundation 
to gain insights about actual  risk-taking behaviors of borrowers. Nevertheless, 
future research should replicate the current experiment with different people in 
different settings to pursue a higher degree of external validity.   
 
We provide two decision tasks (mortgage task and bond task) to participants to 
measure their preference for an ARM (VRB) or a FRM (FRB). Note that in order to 
test the Prospect theory’s reflection effect on a borrowers’ choice of mortgage type, 
it is necessary to prepare a gain decision situation in which test subjects can be 
screened to identify individuals who behave in a risk-averse fashion as suggested 105        Mori, Diaz III and Ziobrowski 
 
both by the Prospect theory and traditional expected utility theory since the reflection 
hypothesis only predicts the behavior of risk-averse people in loss situations. The 
mortgage decision task is a choice between an ARM and a FRM. The bond decision 
task is a choice between a VRB and FRB. A copy of experiment cases is included in 
Appendices A and B. The cases simplify mortgage and bond decision problems to 
isolate a cause-effect relationship between borrower risk preferences and the sign of 
cash flow by controlling for alternative explanations, while maintaining enough 
reality so that participants can perceive cases as mortgage and bond decision tasks. 
In other words, the cases were prepared to test the Prospect theory’s reflection 
hypothesis with high internal validity under the mortgage decision context, which 
entails a greater degree of uncertainty than lottery choice problems used by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).   
 
A 5-year holding period was specified in the mortgage case based on the median 
tenure period of American homeowners to control for a potential confounding factor; 
mobility. The bond case states that participants are planning to hold a bond until its 
maturity, which is also 5 years. Table 1 summarizes the parameters in both the 
mortgage and bond instruments, maintaining consistency except for the sign of cash 
flows.  
 
Table 1  Summary of Mortgage and Bond Instruments in Cases 
MORTGAGES ARM  FRM 
Loan amount  $150,000 $150,000 
Initial rate  8% 8% 
Payoff period  30 years  30 years 
Payment frequency  Monthly Monthly 
Interest rate adjustment period  1 year  - 
Periodic and lifetime cap  No - 
BONDS VRB  FRB 
Issue Price  $150,000 $150,000 
Initial Coupon rate  8% 8% 
Maturity  5 years  5 years 
Coupon frequency  Monthly Monthly 
Coupon rate adjustment period  1 year  - 
 
Prior studies show that people tend to choose ARMs when interest rates are above 
the historical average and FRMs when interest rates are below average. To try to 
avoid any bias caused by perceptions of participants on interest rate levels, the 
historical average rate for FRMs (8%) was used as the initial rates for all instruments. 
This also controls for the anchoring effect by the  teaser rate of ARMs, i.e., if we 
introduce a realistic rate differential between an ARM and a FRM in the mortgage 
case, it would be impossible to judge if the choice of ARMs is due to the rate 
differential or the psychological factor that we are testing. The case also states that 
the  interest rates of ARMs can potentially range from 11% (+3%) to 5% (-3%), 
which is based on the historical levels of FRM interest rates.   
 Borrowers Choose Adjustable-Rate Mortgages over Fixed-Rate Mortgages        106 
 
 
In addition, the cases present expectations regarding inflation rates, participant 
income, and house price. Again, to try to avoid any bias caused by expectations of 
participants, a neutral scenario was prepared in which income and house price are 
expected to increase at the same rate as inflation. Finally, the cases provide 6-point 
scales with which the preferences of participants for an ARM (VRB) or a FRM 
(FRB) were measured. Since the 6-point scale does not have a mid-point, 
participants were forced to show their preference toward one of two instruments, 
which mimics a mortgage decision in real life. A score of 1 represents the strongest 
preference for variable-rate products, while a score of 6 represents the strongest 
preference for fixed-rate products. Some demographic questions were also asked.
3  
 
Both tasks were conducted using a web-application developed for the present study. 
The within-subjects design (repeated measures analysis) was used for the main 
treatment (sign of cash flow) in which each participant conducted both the mortgage 
and bond cases because this type of analysis usually allows for a more powerful 
estimation of effects than between-subjects designs. Counterbalancing is used in 
which approximately half of the participants (Group A) conducted the mortgage case 
first and the bond case second while the other half of the participants (Group B) 
conducted the bond case first and the mortgage case second. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two experimental groups. Therefore, the 
experimental design to test the hypothesis is a 2 x 2 counterbalanced design. The 
within-subjects factor is the sign of cash flow fixed at two levels: bond (positive cash 
flow) and mortgage (negative cash flow). The between-subjects factor is the 
counterbalancing sequence fixed at two levels: mortgage-bond sequence and 
bond-mortgage sequence. The design is summarized in Table 2.   
 
 
Table 2  Summary of Experimental Design 
   Sign of Cash Flow (within-subjects) 
   Mortgage (negative)  Bond (positive) 
Mortgage-Bond 
















































Sequence  III IV 
 
Within the 2 x 2 counterbalanced design, the initial task that the participants 
undertook was expected to enforce the hypothesized decision frames within their 
second task. This was to be achieved by sensitizing participants toward the sign of 
cash flow, which mimics decision-making in real life, so that they frame their second 
task as a choice between the two types of positive prospects under risk for the bond 
case, or as a choice between the two types of negative prospects under risk for the 
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mortgage case. Thus, the main focus in testing the research hypotheses is on 
decisions under the framing control situation. The decision results of participants 
under situations that have no framing control are separately analyzed as an 
exploratory analysis, primarily to gain implications for further study on the topic. 
 
As not all borrowers necessarily frame the choice of mortgage in the same way, not 
all borrowers necessarily make their decisions in the same fashion. We hypothesized 
that when choosing a mortgage type, people, who show risk-averse (RA) preferences 
when choosing a bond type, may behave differently from people, who show 
risk-seeking (RS) preferences when choosing a bond type. Since testing behaviors of 
both RA and RS participants at the same time could mask important implications, we 
separately examined the behaviors of the participants based on their risk preferences 
in a bond choice. We defined RA people as participants with preference scores of 4, 
5, or 6 and RS people as those with preference scores of 1, 2, or 3 when choosing a 
bond type. 
 
Thus, we defined four groups for our analyses; 1) RA-framing control, 2) RA-no 
framing control, 3) RS-framing control, and 4) RS-no framing control. The direct test 
of the research hypothesis is an independent two-sample T test, which tests the 
difference in preference score, focusing on the RA-framing control group between 
participants in Cell II versus Cell III in Table 2. 
 
We used business professionals as experiment participants, since these participants 
are likely to have already made home mortgage decisions in the past or will make 
such decisions in the near future. In fact, the post-experiment survey found that more 
than 80% of experiment participants have borrowed home mortgage loans to 
purchase their personal residences at least once and 17% of them have experienced 
mortgage choice more than twice. Thus, this group of participants is a good 
representative of entry-level homebuyers in the U.S. Also, these participants have 
relatively homogeneous characteristics, such as age, income, education level, and 
work experience, which are potential confounding factors in this study.   
 
Ninety-two business professionals participated in the study. Among the 92 
participants, 7 were excluded from the analysis because they reported that they had 
taken some real estate courses and showed significantly different behaviors (strongly 
risk-averse, leaning toward FRMs) from the remaining participants, t(90) = -2.40, p 
< .05 (two-tailed). Thus, the usable sample consists of 85 participants. Table 3 
provides an overview of important characteristics of the experimental sample. 
Among the 85 participants, 68 are U.S. nationals and 17 are foreigners. All subjects 
are combined into one group of U.S. homebuyers, since there are no significant 
differences in mortgage and bond risk preference scores between these two groups 
(t[83] = -0.83, p > .10; and t[83] = 1.41, p > .10, respectively). The average age of 
the 85 participants is 32 with a mode of 33. According to the National Association of 
Realtors (National Association of Realtors, 2006), the median age of entry-level U.S. 
homebuyers was 32 in 2005. Therefore, this group of experiment participants is 
reasonably representative of entry-level homebuyers in the U.S. Fifty-five percent of Borrowers Choose Adjustable-Rate Mortgages over Fixed-Rate Mortgages        108 
 
 
the participants are married, which is very close to the married couples’ share (61%) 
of the U.S. housing market, further supporting the validity of the sample.   
 
As shown in Table 3, 60% of the participants have a household income of greater 
than $75,000, which is a group with relatively high income. Admittedly, further 
investigations with lower income groups should be conducted to allow for any 
confidence generalizing beyond the currently-studied samples. Still, findings of this 
study are significant since empirical studies both in the U.S. and U.K found that 
income level has a negligible effect on mortgage choice (Dhillon, Shilling, & 
Sirmans, 1987; Phillips & VanderHoff, 1994; Leece, 2001). Table 3 generally 
demonstrates a high degree of homogeneity of household income, work experience, 
and education level. Several statistical tests found no significant effects of these 
demographic factors on preference scores.
4 Thus, the sample of 85 U.S. participants 
can be treated statistically as one homogeneous group. 
 
 
Table 3    Summary of Participant Profiles 
Item  Category  Number  Percentage 
  Male    47    55.3%  Gender 
  Female    38    44.7% 
  U.S.    68    80.0%  Nationality 
  Non-U.S.    17    20.0% 
  Married    47    55.3%  Marital Status 
  Single    38    44.7% 
  Under  $20,000    5    5.9% 
  $20,000  -  $34,999    1    1.2% 
  $35,000  -  $49,999    7    8.2% 
  $50,000  -  $74,999    18    21.2% 
  $75,000  -  $99,999    17    20.0% 
  $100,000  or  more    34    40.0% 
Household Income 
  Not  Answered    3    3.5% 
  2  years  or  less    8    9.4% 
  3  to  5  years    17    20.0% 
  6  to  10  years    34    40.0% 
  11  to  15  years    14    16.5% 
  16  to  20  years    6    7.1% 
Work Experience 
  21  or  more  years    6    7.1% 
  Bachelor  Degree    62    73.0% 
  Master  Degree    22    25.9% 
Education 
(Degree obtained) 
  Doctoral  Degree    1    1.2% 
                                            
4  Test results are available from the authors upon request. 109        Mori, Diaz III and Ziobrowski 
 
                                           
4.  Results 
 
Among the 85 participants, 52 (61%) have exhibited risk-averse preferences when 
choosing a bond type. Since the Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis predicts that 
risk-averse people show the preference reversal in loss situations, these risk-averse 
participants become the main focus of our research hypothesis and are labeled RA. 
The remaining 33 participants demonstrate risk-seeking preferences when choosing a 
bond type, so they are labeled RS and analyzed separately as an exploratory analysis. 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the behavior of the participants who demonstrated a risk-averse 
preference (preference score of 4, 5 or 6) when choosing a bond type. The left pane 
shows scores under framing control situations (i.e., scores collected during the 
second tasks of the participants) and the right pane shows those under no-framing 
control situations (i.e., scores collected during the first tasks of the participants). The 
research hypothesis was tested directly by comparing risk preference between the 
bond choice and mortgage choice under the hypothesized decision frames focusing 
on the RA-framing control group (left pane of Figure 2). The null hypothesis tested 
was that the mean for the mortgage case (negative cash flow) is equal to or larger 
(more risk-averse) than the mean for the bond case (positive cash flow). An 
independent two-sample T test assuming unequal variances rejected the null 
hypothesis, t(25) = 1.68, one-tailed p < .05. Thus, the research hypothesis, which is 
essentially, the Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis, is supported; that is, people, 
who demonstrate a risk-averse preference for a FRB over a VRB when choosing a 
bond type, significantly change their risk preferences when choosing a mortgage 
type, leaning more toward ARMs under the hypothesized decision frames. Note that 
both the mortgage and bond cases were designed to be consistent except for the sign 
of cash flows. Thus, the preference reversal observed with RA participants is likely 
due to the effect proposed by the Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis. This 




For overall RA participants, a two-way mixed ANOVA reveals that the main 
between-subjects effect of the counterbalancing sequence is almost significant and 
the interaction effect between the sign of cash flow and counterbalancing sequence is 
strongly significant (F[1,50] = 3.99, two-tailed p = .051 and F[1,50] = 9.20, 
two-tailed p < .01, respectively). The significant interaction effect suggests different 
behaviors between participants with different framing control conditions. As shown 
in the right pane in Figure 2, participants do not significantly change their risk 
preferences between the mortgage choice and bond choice under the no framing 
control situation, favoring both fixed rate bonds and mortgages. The findings suggest 
that a deeper understanding about the ways that borrowers frame mortgage choices is 
required. At this point, we suspect that when participants conducted the mortgage 
case as their first task, they might not have recognized a mortgage as a loss situation 
as hypothesized. Arguably, participants with no-framing control could have framed 
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their mortgage choice in two ways. First, they could have framed the choice between 
ARMs and FRMs as the choice of buying or not buying insurance against the interest 
rate risk of ARMs. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) imply that they should tend to 
choose FRMs over ARMs in such a case, because they are less averse to the certain 
negative payments of FRMs than when they frame the choice between ARMs and 
FRMs as a choice between two types of losses. This behavior, seen with cost framing, 
is consistent with the results under a no framing control situation. Secondly, without 
the framing control, participants might think of the mortgage as a gain situation 
associated with getting a house. When given the bond choice first, participants 
recognized the mortgage as a loss situation and became more risk-seeking, as 
suggested by the Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis. Thus, future investigations 
into the situations and conditions wherein borrowers frame mortgage choices will be 
of importance to gain insights into the risks of ARM borrowers. 
 
 























Framing Control No-Framing Control
 
Note: RA participants are the 52 individuals who exhibit risk-averse preferences when 
choosing a bond type. The left pane shows the results under a framing control 
situation and the right pane shows the results under a no-framing control situation. 
 
 
Although we have proposed no hypothesis for risk-seeking individuals, as an 
exploratory exercise, we examined the behaviors of the 33 RS participants who 
exhibited a risk-seeking preference (preference scores of 1, 2, or 3) when choosing a 
bond type. As summarized in Figure 3, ANOVA reveals a strongly significant main 
effect of sign of cash flow, F(1,31) = 67.57, one-tailed p  < .01. There are no 
significant effects of the counterbalancing sequence or any significant interaction 
between the sign of cash flow and counterbalancing sequence (F[1,31] = .001, 
two-tailed p > .10; and F[1,31] = .38, two-tailed p > .01, respectively). Thus, RS 
participants change their risk preferences significantly to the more risk-averse 111        Mori, Diaz III and Ziobrowski 
 
preference of a FRM when choosing a mortgage type, regardless of task sequence 
(i.e., framing control condition). Although the behavior of RS participants should be 
investigated further with formal research hypotheses, we argue that RS participants 
may have a myopic view with a strong propensity for current consumption. When 
people invest in a bond, they must put their money into it, which represents negative 
cash flow at the present moment. Therefore, myopic individuals may view bond 
investment selection as part of a loss situation, resulting in risk-seeking behavior 
despite a future income stream. On the other hand, when people take out a mortgage, 
they obtain a lump sum of money for a home purchase, which is positive cash flow at 
the present moment. Therefore, myopic people may view mortgage selection as part 
of a gain situation, resulting in risk-averse behavior despite future payments. 
 
 





















Framing Control No-Framing Control
 
 
Note: RS participants are the 33 individuals who exhibit risk-seeking preferences when 
choosing a bond type. The left pane shows the results under a framing control 
situation and the right pane shows the results under a no-framing control situation. 
 
 
5.  Discussions and Conclusions 
 
This research tests the Prospect Theory’s reflection hypothesis as a contributing 
factor in a borrower’s choice of mortgage type. The following two decision frames 
are enforced in the within-subjects design: 1) the choice between ARMs and FRMs 
as a choice between two types of negative prospects (loss situation) under conditions 
of uncertainty; and 2) the choice between FRBs and VRBs as a choice between two 
types of positive prospects (gain situation) under conditions of uncertainty. Under 
these hypothesized decision frames, we have tested the research hypothesis that 
people who exhibit a risk-averse preference for a FRB over a VRB when choosing a Borrowers Choose Adjustable-Rate Mortgages over Fixed-Rate Mortgages        112 
 
 
bond type, tend to demonstrate a risk-seeking preference for an ARM over a FRM. 
Experiments are conducted using business professionals. 
 
The analysis supports the research hypothesis, suggesting that risk-averse people 
tend to become more risk-seeking when choosing a mortgage type, leaning more 
toward ARMs when they frame the mortgage choice problem as part of a loss 
situation. Psychological factors may explain why ARM borrowers tend to ignore the 
risk factors associated with ARMs, focusing heavily upon pricing factors when 
choosing mortgage type. 
 
In addition, other behaviors are identified that help generate research hypotheses for 
future research. Figure 4 summarizes the behaviors of the participants, revealed and 
implied by the current study. The analysis separates the overall sample into two 
groups: RA participants, who demonstrate a risk-averse preference when choosing a 
bond type; and RS participants, who demonstrate a risk-seeking preference when 
choosing a bond type. It can be argued that RS participants may be myopic, 
harboring a strong propensity for current consumption and viewing bond investment 
selection as part of a loss situation. As a result, they behave in a risk-seeking manner 
when choosing a bond type, even given the prospect of future income. On the other 
hand, RA participants may be investment-oriented, and have a propensity for asset 
accumulation, viewing bond investment selection as part of a gain situation, resulting 
in risk-averse behavior. 
 
RA participants could have framed the mortgage choice problem in three potential 
ways. First, when participants conduct the mortgage case as their second task, with 
the positive bond choice first, participants clearly appear to view mortgage selection 
as a choice between two types of negative prospects (loss situation) associated with 
uncertainty. In such a case, risk-averse individuals tend to become more risk-seeking 
when choosing a mortgage type, which implies that risk factors are less important for 
them. Therefore, they tend to focus more on pricing factors when choosing a 
mortgage type, as suggested by previous empirical studies. Secondly, RA 
participants could have framed the choice between ARMs and FRMs as the choice of 
purchasing or not purchasing insurance against the interest rate risk of ARMs. In 
such a case, they choose a FRM over an ARM, because they are less averse to the 
certain negative payments of a FRM than when they frame mortgage choice as two 
types of losses, as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1984). Finally, RA 
participants might think that a mortgage is a gain situation, associated with attaining 
a house, again resulting in a risk-averse preference for a FRM for the future payment 
stream, perhaps to secure the gain (home) at the present moment. 
 
RS participants, who have behaved in a risk-seeking fashion in positive choice 
situations and choose a variable rate bond over a fixed rate bond, tend to avoid risk, 
with a FRM as their mortgage choice. This result suggests that myopic individuals 
may view bond investment selection as part of a negative (loss) choice, resulting in 
risk-seeking behavior, while they view mortgage selection as part of a positive (gain) 
choice, resulting in risk-averse behavior. The behavior of RS participants is totally 113        Mori, Diaz III and Ziobrowski 
 
independent of the counterbalancing sequence, which implies that all RS participants 
framed the mortgage choice decision in the same way.     
 






Framing Gain Situation Loss Situation







Cost or Gain Situation
Risk-Averse (FRM)  
 
Note: Non-myopic homebuyers are the 52 (61%) RA participants, while myopic homebuyers   
are the 33 (39%) RS participants. The main focus of the current study is the behavior of 
the non-myopic investors under the hypothesized decision frame (gain for bond choice 
and loss for mortgage choice), which results in a risk-seeking preference for an ARM. 
This finding supports the research hypothesis, which, in turn, had been motivated by the 
Prospect theory’s reflection hypothesis. 
 
 
Overall, the results suggest that borrowers behave differently depending upon the 
combination of 1) their propensity for current consumption (i.e. 
consumption-oriented versus investment oriented); and 2) the ways that they frame 
the mortgage-choice decision. 
 
In this study, we focus on behaviors of U.S. borrowers. Globally, some cultural 
factors can also play a role in the choice of mortgage. Hofstede (1991, 2001) 
suggests that people from different countries evaluate uncertain events in different 
ways. Thus, comparing risk preferences of borrowers in the choice of mortgage 
among different cultures should be examined in future research. The findings may be 
of great importance globally for governments and lenders in developing and 
introducing new mortgage products in countries with diverse cultures. Based upon 
the results of the current study, it appears that the behaviors of most borrowers may 
differ depending upon the ways that they frame a mortgage choice decision. For 
example, Figure 4 suggests that risk-averse participants view a mortgage choice as 
part of a loss situation when they are sensitized toward future cash flow. It is Borrowers Choose Adjustable-Rate Mortgages over Fixed-Rate Mortgages        114 
 
 
arguable that in the real world, borrowers may be most sensitized toward the future 
cash flows of a mortgage product when the volatilities of future interest rates, 
inflation, or their household income are expected to rise. In such situations, 
borrowers may behave in a risk-seeking fashion, focusing more on pricing factors 
when choosing a mortgage type. This exposes borrowers to a great amount of 
unexpected foreclosure risk. Thus, further investigations into the situations and 
conditions wherein borrowers frame mortgage choices as part of a loss situation will 
be of importance to gain more insights into the risks of ARM borrowers. The current 
results are derived under the situation wherein the initial rates are set to be the same 
for both the ARM and FRM. A hypothetical (controlled) setting is used to ensure the 
study’s high internal validity. Thus, the impact of the ARM-FRM rate differential on 
borrower behaviors is also of general interest to answer the following questions: 
How much of the rate differential will make borrowers favor an ARM? Does the size 
of the impact differ between RA and RS, and among borrowers in different cultures? 
Finally, some direct investigation into the effect of propensity for current 
consumption on the choice of mortgage is warranted, since the current study does not 
measure the propensity for current consumption. It should also be noted that all 
participants of our experiments are relatively highly educated people. Transferring 
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Appendix A: Mortgage Case 
 
Instruction – Please read this instruction first. 
In this task, you will be asked to choose between two types of mortgage loans based 
on information supplied to you.  Please carefully read all information before 
making your decision and make your decision under specified situations and 
assumptions. 
 
Your current situation 
You are about to take out a $150,000 home mortgage loan to purchase your new 
personal residence.    You are free to choose between two types of mortgage loans as 




1)  Adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM)
 6 
The adjustable-rate mortgage available to you is a full-amortization mortgage.  
Loan terms are provided below: 
 
¾  Initial rate = 8%  ¾  Principal is paid off in 30 years 
¾  Payment frequency = monthly  ¾  Interest rate adjustment period
7 = 1 year 




2)  Fixed-rate mortgage (FRM)
9 
The fixed-rate mortgage available to you is also a full-amortization mortgage.    Loan 
terms are provided below: 
¾  Interest rate = 8% 
¾  Principal is paid off in 30 years 
¾  Payment frequency = monthly 
 
 
ARM interest rate expectation 
The ARM initial rate and FRM interest rate of 8% are set at this level based on the 
historical average rate.    Therefore, you can expect that the average interest rate will 
be around 8% in the long run.   However, there is no guarantee that the interest rate 
will be around 8% for the next 5 years.  It is assumed that there is an equal chance 
that the interest rate will move up to 11% (+ 3%) or down to 5% (– 3%) and you 
                                            
6  Adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) is a mortgage in which the interest rate is not fixed but is 
tied to an index (market interest rate) and is periodically adjusted as the rate index moves up 
or down. 
7  This ARM changes its rate once a year. 
8 Periodic (Lifetime) cap is a provision of an adjustable rate mortgage limiting how much 
interest rates may increase in a single adjustment period (during the mortgage term). 
9 Fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) specifies an interest rate that stays fixed for the life of the 
mortgage regardless of market conditions. Borrowers Choose Adjustable-Rate Mortgages over Fixed-Rate Mortgages        118 
 
 
don’t know when these changes could happen.  The following table shows your 
monthly and annual payments based on several interest rates assuming the remaining 
balance of $150,000 and the remaining loan term of 30 years.     
 
Frequency/Interest Rate 8%  (FRM)  11%  5% 
Monthly payments  $1,100.65 $1,428.49  $805.23 
Annual payments  $13,207.76 $17,141.82 $9,662.79 
 
Note that if you choose the FRM, your monthly and annual payments will be fixed at 
$1,100.65 and $13,207.76, respectively. 
 
Expectations of inflation, your income, and your house price 
Based on the historical inflation rate, the annual inflation rate is expected to be 3% 




After taking out a mortgage, you will have payments for the next 5 years, which are 
fixed with the FRM and tied to a market interest rate with the ARM.    This task is 
the choice between two types of payments in the future.    There is no right or wrong 
answer for this task. 
 
 
Under the situations and assumptions supplied to you, please rate your 
preference for the ARM or FRM using below scale. 
 
1            2             3             4             5             6  
             P r e f e r e n c e   f o r                                             
Preference  for     
                   A R M                                             
FRM 119        Mori, Diaz III and Ziobrowski 
 
Appendix B: Bond Case 
 
Instruction – Please read this instruction first. 
In this task, you will be asked to choose between two types of bond investments 
based on information supplied to you.  Please carefully read all information before 
making your decision and make your decision under specified situations and 
assumptions. 
 
Your current situation 
You are about to invest $150,000 in a bond.  You are free to choose between two 
types of bond investments as described below.  You are planning to hold the bond 
until the maturity. 
 
Bond type 
1)  Variable-rate bond (VRB)
10 
The variable-rate bond available to you is a coupon bond issued by the U.S. 
government, with which you will receive coupon payments until maturity, when you 
receive the full principal.  Default risk does not exist.  Other bond terms are 
provided below: 
 
¾  Initial coupon rate = 8%  ¾  Maturity = 5 years 
¾  Coupon frequency = monthly  ¾  Coupon rate adjustment period
11 = 1 
year 
¾  Issue price = $150,000   
 
 
2)  Fixed-rate bond (FRB)
12 
The fixed-rate bond available to you is also a coupon bond issued by the U.S. 
government.    Default risk does not exist.    Other bond terms are provided below: 
¾  Coupon rate = 8%  ¾  Maturity = 5 years 
¾  Coupon frequency = monthly  ¾  Issue price = $150,000 
 
VRB coupon rate expectation 
The VRB initial coupon rate and FRB coupon rate of 8% are set at this level based 
on the historical average rate.  Therefore, you can expect that the average coupon 
rate will be around 8% in the long run.  However, there is no guarantee that the 
coupon rate will be around 8% for the next 5 years.  It is assumed that there is an 
equal chance that the coupon rate will move up to 11% (+ 3%) or down to 5% (– 
3%) and you don’t know when these changes could happen.  The following table 
shows your monthly and annual coupon receipts based on several coupon rates. 
 
                                            
10  Variable-rate bond (VRB) is a bond in which the coupon rate is not fixed but is tied to an   
index (market interest rate) and is periodically adjusted as the rate index moves up or down. 
11  This VRB changes its coupon rate once a year. 
12  Fixed-rate bond (FRB) specifies a coupon rate that stays fixed for the life of the bond   





Frequency/Coupon Rate  8% (FRB)  11%  5% 
Monthly receipts $1,000.00  $1,375.00 $625.00 
Annual receipts $12,000.00 $16,500.00 $7,500.00 
Note that if you choose the FRB, your monthly and annual coupon receipts will be 
fixed at $1,000.00 and $12,000.00, respectively. 
 
Expectations of inflation and your income 
Based on the historical inflation rate, the annual inflation rate is expected to be 3% 
for 5 years.    Your income is assumed to increase at the same rate as inflation. 
 
Decision 
After investing in a bond, you will receive income for the next 5 years, which are 
fixed with the FRB and tied to a market interest rate with the VRB.    This task is the 
choice between two types of income in the future.    There is no right or wrong 
answer for this task. 
 
Under the situations and assumptions supplied to you, please rate your 
preference for the VRB or FRB using below scale. 
 
1            2             3             4             5             6  
             P r e f e r e n c e   f o r                                             
Preference  for     
                   V R B                                              
FRB 
 
 